ABSTRACT Recently, the sport of mountaineering is a popular leisure activity and many people may injure while mountaineering. In the year of 2014, Chen et al. suggested a cloud-based emergency response and SOS system for mountaineering travelers when they encounter dangers. Chen et al. claimed that their proposed system is secure against various known attacks and the executive performance of the system is reasonable when the protocol is implemented on the traveler's mobile device. However, in this paper, we discover that Chen et al.'s scheme is unable to protect the privacy of mountaineering travelers and the vulnerability allows a malicious attacker to spy on the electronic medical records of all mountaineering travelers by launching eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, Chen et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack when the mobile device of the mountaineering traveler is lost or stolen by an attacker. In order to repair these shortcomings existing in Chen et al.'s scheme, we suggest an improved version of their scheme, which is provably secure in the random oracle model under the DDH and CDH problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, outdoor sports, such as mountaineering, river tracing, rafting, etc., have become increasingly popular [1] . However, these kinds of sports often involve considerable dangers. Since these dangers may occur in solitary roads or desert hills, a rapid and safe first aid service is vital for emergency events. Fortunately, with the ever-changing nature of wireless communication technology and the popularity of smart phones, people in danger can easily and rapidly request emergency services.
In 2014, Chen et al. [2] proposed a platform based on cloud computing architecture. In their design, a traveler who is in danger and in need of rescue and send a SOS message to a mountain emergency service center with his smart phone. An investigator or staff of this mountain emergency service center then sends this emergency message to a suitable hospital nearby. Since this traveler may come from other countries and this hospital may not have any useful information about this traveler, this hospital can send an emergency message to CSDH (Cloud Server of Department of Health), which is a cloud server storing EMR (electronic medical record) of all patients, to acquire the EMR of this traveler. With the EMR, this hospital now can arrange a proper doctor for this traveler. To the best of our understanding, this platform is the first one designed for mountaineering events.
Chen et al. [2] also proposed a scheme to protect the secrecy and privacy for their platform. They adopt the Schnorr signature [3] , [4] , RSA [5] , and ElGamal [6] . However, we still found Chen et al.'s scheme has the following drawbacks and weaknesses. First, this scheme fails to protect traveler privacy. In addition, this scheme suffers from unfriendly design in registration phase. This scheme also lacks a random nonce in the delegation phase and in the signing and verification phase. Furthermore, in Chen et al.'s scheme, they claimed that a traveler does not need to worry that his mobile device will be illegally used if his mobile device is lost or stolen by attackers. However, we found that the attacker may derive the password of the traveler by launching off-line password guessing attacks.
We also try to understand the reason why this scheme is rather insecure. It appears this scheme is a common structure problem -not being proven securely in a formal model. In this paper, we first demonstrate that Chen et al.'s scheme [2] still has some drawbacks. In order to fix the drawbacks existing in their scheme, we propose a new scheme that is provable secure in the random oracle model [7] , [8] and under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problems. According to the performance analysis, our scheme has better efficiency compared with Chen et al's scheme [2] .
The reset of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first introduce the entire architecture of a cloud-based emergency system and present Chen et al.'s authentication scheme for mountaineering events in Section III. In Section IV, we demonstrate some security and design drawbacks of Chen et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme is demonstrated in Section V and we provide a formal security proof in Section VI. In Section VII, we analyze the efficiency of our proposed scheme and compare it with Chen et al.'s scheme. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR MOUNTAINEERING EVENTS
In cloud-based emergency system for mountaineering events, four parties participate in this system: Cloud Server of Department of Health (CSDH ), Traveler (T ), Investigator (I ), and Doctor (D). Before accessing the system, every Traveler must register with the Cloud Server of Department of Health (CSDH ) and CSDH will issue some login parameters for the patient. Note that CDSH is a trusted third party. Moreover, every Investigator must register with CSDH . Before mountaineering, T has to delegate the Investigator I and issued a signed warrant for I . When T encounters danger during mountaineering, T sends the SOS message to the designated I and I notifies the appointed Doctor D to prepare to diagnose T . Finally, D can download T 's electronic medical record EMR from CSDH and upload freshest EMR to CSDH after diagnosing T . Fig 1 shows the entire architecture of Chen et al.'s emergency system for mountaineering events.
Step 1. The Travel T goes to the the Cloud Server of the Department of Health CSDH to register to be a legal user. In addition, the Investigator I also registers to be a legal collaborator with CSDH . Step 2. Before mountaineering, the Traveler T has to inform the Investigator I of the mountain emergency service center. Step 3. In case of danger, the Traveler T sends the SOS message to the designated Investigator I by using his/her mobile device. 
III. REVIEW OF Chen et al.'s SCHEME
This section briefly reviews Chen et al.'s scheme [2] and there are six phases involve in Chen et al.'s scheme: registration phase, login phase, delegation phase, signing and verification phase, password change phase, and revoking the privacy phase. For convenience of description, terminology and notations used in the paper are summarized as follows:
• ID X : The identity of party X .
• PW X : The password of party X .
• p, q: Two large prime numbers with q|(p − 1).
• g: An element of order q in Z * p .
• m: The signed message.
• m req : The SOS request message.
• Time i : The time of the doctor finishes the diagnosis.
• cert w : The warrant issued by Traveler.
• EMR: The electronic medical record of the patients.
• msk: The master secret key of CSDH.
• x X /y X : The private/public key pair of party X , where y X = g x X mod p.
• SK ab : The session key shared between a and b.
•
The symmetric encryption/decryption function with key k. VOLUME 5, 2017 • sign x : A signature generation algorithm by using a private key x to sign a message.
• verify y : A signature verification algorithm by using a public key y to verify the validity of the signature, where y = g x mod p.
• h(·): A one-way hash function.
• MAC i : The ith message authentication code.
• σ i : The digital signature of m.
• r X : The random number generated by X .
• N X : The nonce value generated by X .
• +: The addition operation.
• −: The subtraction operation.
• ||: The message concatenation.
• ⊕: The XOR operation.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
In this phase, the Traveler T and Investigator I must register with the Cloud Server of Department of Health CSDH through a secure channel to become legal identities. The details of registration phase are as follows:
Step 1. T submits the identity ID T to CSDH .
Step 2. After receiving T 's ID T , CSDH generates a random number r CSDH and computes 
B. LOGIN PHASE
Before T takes his/her mobile device to mountaineer, T performs the login procedures as follows:
Step 1. In order to verify T is the owner of the mobile device, T enters identity ID T and password PW T .
Step 2. The mobile device computes h(r CSDH ||msk) = Q ⊕ h(ID T ||h(PW T )) and V = h(ID T ||h(PW T ) ⊕ h(r CSDH ||msk) ) and checks whether V = V . If it holds, it means T is the legal owner of the mobile device.
C. DELEGATION PHASE
Before mountaineering, the Traveler T has to delegate the Investigator I on a secure channel (e.g., face-to-face). Then T can use his/her mobile device to send the SOS message to I when he/she encounters danger. The details of delegation phase are as follows:
Step 1. T and I establish a session key SK T −I .
Step 2. T generates a random nonce N T ∈ Z * q and a warrant cert w and computes 
E. PASSWORD CHANGE PHASE
When the Traveler T wants to change his/her original password PW T to a new password PW T new , T has to perform the authentication steps which are the same as in the login phase.
Step 1. After confirming that T is a legal owner of the mobile device, T can input a new password and compute
Step 2. Finally, T replaces Q with Q new and finishes this phase.
F. REVOKING THE PRIVACY PHASE
If an Investigator I goes against the CSDH 's rule, CSDH publishes I 's identity ID I to revoke the I 's authority.
IV. DRAWBACKS OF Chen et al.'s SCHEME
In this section, we demonstrate that Chen et al.'s scheme has some security and design drawbacks which are described in the following subsections. 
A. FAILS TO PROTECT TRAVELER PRIVACY

E. STOLEN MOBILE DEVICE ATTACKS
In Chen et al.'s scheme, they claimed that the Traveler does not need to worry his/her mobile device will be illegally used if the Traveler's mobile device is lost or stolen by attackers. However, we found that the attacker may derive the password of the Traveler by launching off-line password guessing attacks. We further provide the detailed explanation of this attack through the following steps:
Step 1. The attacker eavesdrops the Traveler's identity ID T from public channels.
Step 2. The attacker collects the parameters (Q, V , h(·)) stored in Traveler's mobile device, where
Step 3. The attacker guesses a candidate password PW *
T and computes G
Step 4. The attacker checks whether the computed V * is equal to the stored V or not. If it is equal, the Traveler's password is successfully guessed. Otherwise, the attacker repeats Step 3 and Step 4 until the correct password is found. From the above descriptions, any password stored in Traveler's mobile device will not safe because there is unable to limit attacker's off-line computation.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, an improved scheme is proposed to repair the drawbacks existing in [2] and the presented scheme is composed of seven phases: registration phase, login phase, delegation phase, verification phase, recovery phase, password change phase, and revoking the privacy phase. The detailed descriptions of the proposed scheme are as follows.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
In this phase, the Traveler T , Investigator I and Doctor D must register with the Cloud Server of Department of Health CSDH through a secure channel to become legal identities. The details of registration phase are as follows:
Step CSDH mod p and stores K I −CSDH with N CSDH −I , where y CSDH = g x CSDH is CSDH 's public key.
Step 6. Before accessing the system, the Doctor D and CSDH construct a common secret key 
B. LOGIN PHASE
Before T takes his/her mobile device to mountaineer, T needs to login CSDH and performs the login procedures as follows:
Step 1. In order to verify T is the owner of the mobile device, T enters identity ID T and password PW T . Then T 's mobile device generates a random 
r CSDH −T mod p and R CSDH −T = (Y CSDH −T + PW T ") mod p and checks whether R CSDH −T = R CSDH −T . If it holds, it means PW T = PW T " and CDSH convinces that T is a valid Traveler. Step 3. CSDH computes H CSDH −T = h(ID CSDH || SK CSDH −T ||Time CSDH ) and U CSDH −T = CSDH −T ⊕ h(ID T ||SK CSDH −T ||Time CSDH ) and sends {ID CSDH , H CSDH −T , U CSDH −T , Time CSDH } to T via a public channel. Step 4. After receiving the message from CSDH , T checks if Time T −Time CSDH ≤ T . If it holds, T computes H CSDH −T = h(ID CSDH ||SK T −CSDH ||Time CSDH ) and checks whether H CSDH −T = H CSDH −T . If it holds, T further computes R CSDH −T = U CSDH −T ⊕ h(ID T ||SK T −CSDH ||Time CSDH ) and stores R CSDH −T into his/her new mobile device.
G. REVOKING THE PRIVACY PHASE
In this phase, the executed steps are the same as Chen et al.'s scheme.
VI. SECURITY PROOFS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Various security protocols for different environments or applications have been proposed in the recent years. Some of them identified a vulnerability of their precedences and presented their improved protocols [9] - [14] . These papers formed a paper cracking loop and seemed never end. The root of the problem is that these protocols only work on a heuristic security analysis but not a formal security proof. For this reason, in this section we present a proof of security of the Random Oracle [7] , [8] and a logic proof based on BAN logic [15] .
A. SECURITY OF LOGIN PHASE
In this subsection, we show that the security of login phase in our scheme. Note that in the login phase, we use a twoparty authenticated key exchange protocol. After executing the login phase, the traveler T and CSDH can establish a common key to communication. Here, we adopt a modified security model based on [7] , [16] , [17] to analyze the security of login phase in our scheme. In this model, we define the following assumptions: (1) There are two entities: Traveler T and CSDH ; (2) T can execute an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol with CSDH repeatedly; (3) Each entity involved in a session can be view as oracle.
We denote a oracle i T as the i-th instance of T and a oracle j CSDH as the j-th instance of CSDH in a session for i, j ∈ N; (4) There is an adversary A can access the oracle by issue some queries. Note that according to the oracle queries between A and oracles, it can be used to simulate some attacks made by A in a real AKE protocol.
1) ADVERSARIAL MODEL
Here, we define the capability of adversary A. An adversary A can be viewed as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm. We assume A can potentially control all communications in the networks and A is allowed to make the following queries. Let E ∈ {T , CSDH }.
- 
2) SECURITY OF AKE PROTOCOL
The security of AKE protocol is defined by the following game between the adversary A and an infinite set of oracles i E for E ∈ {T , CSDH } and i ∈ N. Proof: C is given an instance (g, g a , g b ) of the CDH problem, the goal of C is to compute g ab for some a, b ∈ Z * p . Then, C runs A as a subroutine and simulates the attack environment. Firstly, C set public parameters {G p , g, p} and sends it to A. Then, A can make following queries to C. Note that in order to avoid consistently and collusion of the results, C maintains a list L H which initially empty.
-Hash query. When A makes a Hash(m) query to C, C returns a random number h and adds Proof: C is given an instance (g, g a , g b ) of the CDH problem, the goal of C is to compute g ab for some a, b ∈ Z * p . Then, C runs A as a subroutine and simulates the attack environment. Firstly, C set public parameters {G p , g, p, y CSDH = g b } and sends it to A. Then, A can make following queries to C. Note that in order to avoid consistently and collusion of the results, C maintains a list L H which initially empty.
-Hash query. When A makes a Hash(m) query to C, C returns a random number h and adds The probability is
Time CSDH ) to Hash query. We use symbol Forge CSDH to denote the event that A forges CSDH 's transcript. Thus, we can obtain
Set Y T = g a . The challenger C can use A to compute SK CSDH −T = g ab using Y T and y CSDH . In other words, C can solve the CDH problem with advantage 2 
In the random oracle model, the proposed two-party authenticated key agreement protocol P in the login phase is a secure AKE providing forward secrecy under the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and the CDH problems. Precisely, VOLUME 5, 2017 where q ex is the maximum times of making the Execute query and Adv Forge P (t) denotes the advantage of any attacker forges the proposed AKE protocol P.
proof: Assume that A is an active adversary in attacking P with a non-negligible advantage. Note that A is called active, if it can make all queries mentioned in the adversarial model. Then, A obtain the advantage in the following two cases: 1) A forges Traveler's and CSDH 's transcripts. 2) A breaks P without forging any transcripts.
For the case 1, we use A to construct a forger For the case 2, we compute the upper bound of the advantage that A breaks P without forging any transcripts. When A makes an Execute(T , CSDH ) query for Traveler T and CSDH chosen by A, the real execution is returned by the equations, shown at the bottom of this page.
where T denotes the transcript and SK CSDH −T denotes the establishing session key. Since A can obtain T 's password PW T and hash values V T , V CSDH by making Corrupt and Hash queries. However, there values offer no information about x CSDH and r T under the discrete logarithm algorithm.
Then, we can define the distribution We want to show that the problem to distinguish Real from Fake can be reduced to solve the decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) problem. Let (t) = Adv DDH G p
(t).
Claim: For any algorithm A running in time t,
Proof: By the contradiction proof, suppose that A can distinguish Real from Fake. Then, we can construct an algorithm D which can solve the decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) problem, i.e. to distinguish (g a , g b , g ab ) from (g a , g b , R 2 ) for a, b ∈ Z * q and R 2 ∈ G p . We set y CSDH = g a and Y T = g b as the input of D. Then,
we can obtain the resulted advantage on the event ¬Forge which is bounded by 2 · Adv DDH
for the case q ex = 1. Finally, for the case q ex > 1 we have
B. SECURITY OF DELEGATION PHASE
In this subsection, we want to prove the security of our scheme in the delegation phase by the BAN logic [15] , [19] - [22] . We will show that: Traveler T and Investigator I share a secret N CSDH −T ,I which is chosen by CSDH so that T can send the SOS message to I using this secret while T encountering danger. Firstly, we define some notations and rules about the BAN logic as follows:
1) NOTATIONS 1) P |≡ X : P believes X or called P would be entitled to believe X . In particular, P may act as though X is true. 2) P X : P sees X . Someone has sent a message containing X to P and P can read and repeat X .
3) P |∼ X : P once said X . P sent a message including X at some time. Note that it does not know whether the message was sent long ago or during the current run of the protocol, but it knows that P |≡ X when the message was sent. 4) P |⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X . P controls X which is subject to jurisdiction of P and P is trusted for X . 5) (X ): X is fresh. X has not been sent in a message at any time before the execution of current round of the protocol. 6) P K ←→ Q: P and Q may use the shared key K to communicate securely. We say that K is good, if K will never be discovered by any principal except P or Q, or a principal trusted by either P or Q.
The formula X is a secret known only to P and Q, and possibly to principals trusted by P and Q. 8) X Y : The formula X is combined with a secret Y .
2) RULES
1) Message meaning rule for shared secrets:
Y is a secret known only to P and Q and P sees X under Y , then P believes that Q once said X .
2) Nonce verification rule:
It means that if P believes that X is fresh and Q once said X , then P believes Q believes X .
3) Jurisdiction rule: P |≡ Q |⇒ X , P |≡ Q |≡ X P |≡ X . It means that if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X and believes Q believes X , then P believes X .
4) Belief rule:
P |≡ Q |≡ (X , Y ) P |≡ Q |≡ X . It means that if P believes Q believes (X , Y ) then P believes Q believes X .
3) GOALS
We want to show that our scheme should achieve the following goals:
I ).
4) INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS
We define some initial assumptions of our scheme as follows: 
5) IDEALIZE THE COMMUNICATION MESSAGES
Here, we idealize the communication messages of our scheme listed as below:
6) DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Based on the rules of the BAN logic, we prove that our scheme can achieve the defined goals using the initial assumptions. 
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we show the performance analysis of our proposed scheme with Chen et al.'s scheme. Let T H , T xor , T exp , T add , T mul , T sym , T sign , T verify and T RFC2631 denote the time complexity of hash function, XOR operation, exponential operation, addition/subtraction operation, multiplication operation, symmetric encryption/decryption, signature signing operation, signature verification operation and constructing a session key by RFC 2631 protocol, respectively. Table 1 lists the computation cost of all phases of our proposed scheme and Chen et al.'s scheme. Due to the hardware restrictions of Traveler T 's mobile device, in the login and delegation phases, we do not take T sign , T verify and T RFC2631 into account and it is well-known that the time complexity of T H , T add and T xor are negligible as compared to other operations. In addition, the total computational cost of the Investigator I , the Doctor D and Cloud server CSDH in our scheme are 2T xor +3T add +6T H , 2T sym +T add +2T H and 4T xor +2T exp +10T H +2T sym +5T add separately and it is obvious that the performance of our proposed scheme is superior than Chen et al.'s scheme. Finally, the proposed scheme is more appropriate for cloud-assisted emergency system due to it ensures desirable security and is comparable in terms of computational cost with the previous work.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we briefly reviewed Chen et al.'s cloudbased emergency system and shown that the process of data upload in the signing and verification phase is insecure. Although the identities of system participants are strictly verified, the attacker can still spy on the traveler's electronic medical record transmitted via public channels. In addition, Chen et al.'s scheme is also vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack in the case that the mobile device of traveler is lost or stolen. To resist these shortcomings, we put forward an improved scheme preserving traveler privacy by employing the concept of authenticated key exchange and message authentication. We have proved that our improved scheme achieves the goals of mutual authentication and key agreement in the random oracle model and the BAN logic. The analysis shows that our proposed scheme improves the security flaws of Chen et al.'s scheme while maintains the computation efficiency in cloud-based emergency system for mountaineering events.
